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What follows is a first step towards an ontology of conscious 
mental processes. We provide a theoretical foundation and 
characterization of conscious mental processes based on a 
realist theory of intentionality and using BFO as our top-level 
ontology. We distinguish three components of intentional 
mental process: character, directedness, and objective referent, 
and describe several features of the process character and 
directedness significant to defining and classifying mental 
processes. We arrive at the definition of representational 
mental process as a process that is the bringing into being, 
sustaining, modifying, or terminating of a mental 
representation. We conclude by outlining some benefits and 
applications of this approach. 
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Introduction 
Contemporary cognitive science is a highly interdisciplinary 
field which draws on a wide variety of heterogenous data, 
ranging from neurology to the analysis of literary texts. A range 
of ontologies have been developed with the goal of making 
these data more easily discoverable and analyzable. Following 
the principles and methodology of the OBO Foundry can 
provide a means of integrating these different kinds of data 
effectively by creating ontologies which are both orthogonal to 
each other and also interoperable.  
Here we describe the foundations of cognitive process 
ontologies such as the Mental Functioning Ontology (MF) and 
its extensions (1-3). One unique feature of cognitive process 
ontologies is that they can be of value also outside of the 
sciences of cognition in applications in finance, medicine, and 
intelligence analysis, where cognitive processes such as 
planning, diagnosing, and problem-solving play an important 
role (4). Successfully capturing cognitive process data in these 
fields holds the promise of bringing improvements to the 
management of data about cognitive practices and thereby 
providing a new sort of starting point for machine-assisted 
cognition approaches to artificial intelligence. It may also help 
us find better ways of understanding evaluative, forensic, 
diagnostic and other investigative practices (5). 
 
Current cognitive ontologies 
Work on cognitive ontologies has thus far focused on the needs 
of the cognitive sciences and of the mental health domain. The 
most direct and extensively developed and utilized ontologies 
for this domain remain the Mental Functioning Ontology (MF) 
and its modules the Emotion Ontology (MFOEM) and the 
Mental Disease Ontology (MFODO), as well as the Cognitive 
Atlas (1) (2) (6). The goal of these ontologies has been to build 
frameworks for bridging data collected in different sorts of 
cognitive and neurological studies, focusing on familiar types 
of mental processes such as remembering, deciding, attending 
on the one hand (1) (7-9) and on mental disease on the other (3). 
The need for ontologies in the cognitive domain is expressed by 
Poldrack and Yarkoni as follows: 
a search of PubMed reveals more than 1,800 papers whose title or 
abstract includes the phrase “working memory task.” It may not 
register to most of those authors that in using this term (rather 
than a more descriptive term such as “Sternberg item recognition 
task” or “delayed response task”), they are making a theoretical 
claim, i.e. that the task in question provides a way to isolate a 
specific mental process called “working memory’’ (9). 
Hastings, Frishkoff, et al. (7) have noted that recognition tests 
and other similar tasks are used to operationalize the study of 
mental processes. That is to say that they are used to study the 
mental indirectly, by defining mental processes in terms of the 
data by which they are measured. Thus, working memory is 
studied through research on subjects’ responses to recently 
presented stimuli; intelligence is studied through research on 
the accuracy of responses to written questions; and volitional 
decisions are studied through research on physical task 
completion and recording. 
This practice is motivated by an assumption, widespread in the 
neurological science community, according to which mental 
phenomena are not readily observable while associated 
behaviors are. The former are ‘subjective’. At the same time we 
agree with (7) that indirect methods have certain shortcomings.  
For example, “operational definitions rely on particular 
measurement methods, and these methods may not be sensitive 
to all aspects of the phenomenon of interest, or may reflect 
additional processes, e.g., so-called task demands” (7). To 
avoid these shortcomings and improve the interpretation of test 
results we require a way to characterize the mental domain 
directly, which means independently of operationalizing 
techniques and independently of any postulated reductions of 
mental processes to neurological or physiological behavior.  
As in the practice of biological science generally, studies of 
underlying mechanisms always begin with observations of 
organisms and behaviors. This is because the latter are more 
well understood.  The same, we hold, is true of mental entities. 
Operationalization and other modeling techniques may be 
useful and informative in some cases, but they both depend on 
and are improved by an understanding of the initial phenomena 
of interest. Part of the solution to both the bridging and 
operationalization challenges is to provide a way to characterize 
the mental as it is understood pre-theoretically in the sorts of 
subjective experiences that give rise to inquiry into the mind in 
the first place. What is needed for this sort of understanding is 
a characterization of the sorts of mental processes one cites 
when asked questions like “What were you thinking?”, “How 
did you arrive at that diagnosis?”, or simply “How are you 
feeling?” In so far as there are meaningful answers to these 
questions, there are also cognitive processes which we are 
describing when we give such answers. The reason there are 
mental process data is because such processes are observable – 
both directly through introspection (conscious self-awareness) 
and also indirectly, through reports others provide of what they 
observe through introspection. Such reports are readily 
available and can, we believe, serve as a basis for an ontology 
of mental processes. 
Methods 
The theory of intentionality as the starting point for an 
ontology of mental processes 
In the following we provide a theoretical foundation for a 
characterization of mental processes based on a realist theory of 
intentionality. This realist theory was employed already in 
building the Mental Functioning Ontology (MF) as well as 
providing a starting point for the current development of the 
Cognitive Process Ontology (CPO) (5), but in the MF related 
literature the theory itself remained implicit. 
We draw here specifically on the literature of what is called 
realist phenomenology (10–16), which takes as its starting point 
the two-part thesis that 1. the mental phenomenon we are most 
evidently familiar with is our own conscious awareness and that 
2. this conscious awareness bears the defining characteristic 
that it is always consciousness-of one thing or another. If I look 
through the window and become conscious of squirrels on the 
lawn, then my consciousness is successfully directed toward 
those very squirrels. A thought you might have just now of a 
meeting you attended yesterday is about a meeting that 
happened yesterday. As a picture is a picture of something and 
a statement is a statement about something, so thinking is in 
every case a thinking about something. (See Figure 1.) 
This quality of consciousness has traditionally been called 
‘intentionality’, though it is also sometimes referred to using the 
terminology of ‘representations’, as when we say that an act of 
consciousness has a certain ‘representational quality’ (17). In 
more general parlance, intentionality is just what is conveyed 
by the term ‘aboutness’. Aboutness, as we will show, is 







Figure 1: Relation of Aboutness 
Direct realism 
Realism is a view about what entities exists and what our 
knowledge of them consists in. Our approach to the mental is 
called ‘direct realism’ and sometimes referred to as ‘common 
sense realism’, which we characterize by the following 
principles: 
a. The types of entities and features of the real world are 
much as we take them to be in common sense ordinary life 
and our knowledge of those entities is augmented by 
advances in scientific discovery. 
b. Mental processes are the means by which we acquire 
knowledge of, think about, feel towards, and act in 
meaningful ways in relation to the real world. 
c. We can and often do enjoy direct cognitive access to the 
entities and features of the real world and these direct 
cognitive relations are central to our ability to know reality.  
d. The aboutness of mental processes is unrestricted in the 
sense that it can relate to portions of reality of any type, 
including any type of real entity or feature, including types 
themselves and also including instances of these types and 
combinations of types and instances. 
e. Mental processes are natural processes and as such are 
also parts of the natural world. 
These principles entail that our minds have access to a real 
world of which we are a part. We can directly think about real-
world entities and features, as well as acquire knowledge of 
portions of reality out there in the world. Direct realism rejects 
views according to which we can access in our thoughts and 
perceptions at best only inner mental entities such as sense data 
or subjective appearances. It also rejects views according to 
which the real world is made or constructed by the mental 
processes that apprehend it.  
Direct realism does not entail that all intentional conscious 
mental processes involve direct aboutness relations, nor that all 
intentional conscious processes are always about some real 
entity. However, following (18) we maintain that all such non-
veridical and non-relational mental aboutness is ultimately 
dependent and derived in various ways from direct relational 
aboutness to some portion of reality. The ways in which 
intentional conscious mental processes can fail to relate to that 
which they purport to be about is multifarious and is outside the 











that mental processes have intentional qualities whether they 
are direct, indirect, veridical, or non-veridical. Furthermore, we 
note that intentional conscious mental processes can and often 
do directly relate, that we are aware of and can locate these 
cases, and that we can describe the features of mental processes 
that make this possible when it does occur. 
Basic structure of intentional mental processes 
We restrict our discussion to intentional (henceforth 
representational) mental processes of the sort we consciously 
experience. We focus exclusively on non-pathological cases of 
mental processes. We believe that, as in the case of anatomy so 
also in the case of the ontology of the mental, disorders and 
anomalies are best defined in terms of standard (or ‘canonical’) 
cases (19). 
 
We begin with three general observations about 
representational mental processes.  
1. They have a representational structure. 
2. This representational structure is complex. 
3. This representational structure is tied to the portions of 
reality the corresponding mental processes are about in 
non-arbitrary ways. 
We discuss each of these in turn. 
Structure of a mental process 
Three dimensions have traditionally been distinguished in the 
relational structure of representational mental processes, 
namely: character, representational directedness, and 
objective referent (11) (20) (21). 
The character (or ‘mode’) of a representational mental process 
is that feature by which process types such as judging, doubting, 
supposing, inferring, hoping, desiring, and fearing are 
distinguished from each other. Differences in character are 
differences in the way an entity is consciously represented. 
Representational mental processes are not mere cases of 
aboutness; there is always some characteristic way each is about 
something. Wondering whether Jim is ill, doubting that Jim is 
ill, discovering that Jim is ill, and affirming that Jim is ill are 
each about Jim in some specific way. In each case a distinct 
characteristic manner of relating (wondering, doubting, 
discovering, affirming) relates the experiencing subject to the 
same portion of reality, namely, Jim and his illness. 
The representational directedness (or ‘content’) of a mental 
process is the qualitative way an entity is represented to be in 
an experience. This quality is what gives a mental process its 
aboutness to a particular entity as qualified in this or that way. 
For example, it gives rise to the difference between thinking 
about an airplane ticket as yours, or as lost, or as cancelled. 
Mental processes of a single character type can involve a 
different representational directedness. Thus, one might wonder 
about the weather, wonder about your flight times, or wonder 
about that parking spot at the airport. In each case the same 
process character (wondering), is paired to a different 
representational directedness: being “about the weather”, 
“about your flight” or “about that parking spot”, respectively. 
The difference between the character and representational 
directedness is the difference between the manner in which you 
bring something to mind, and the way that thing brought to 
mind is represented to be.  
Character and directedness are mutually dependent parts of a 
representational whole. A pairing of this sort is common to 
many sorts of processes. For example, walking has both a 
manner of walking (for example a certain gait or a limp) and a 
direction of walking. An instance of one type can only exist 
with an instance of the other as parts of a complex whole. This 








Figure 2. Representational Structure 
“| |” indicates a relation of mutual dependence 
 
The objective referent of a mental process is the entity or 
portion of reality that a given thought is or is intended to be 
about – for example the people, meetings, buildings, cars, 
trucks, and so on that we consider in our thoughts or perceive 
in our everyday experience of the world. The object of Jim’s 
doubting, discovering, and affirming in the example above is 
the actual person Jim and his actual illness. It is thus not what 
some might call a concept of Jim or any other theoretical mental 
entity; it is not a bundle of sense data; and it is not any sort of 
image or representation of Jim.  
Representational structure is complex 
The representational qualities involved in mental processes are 
both internally complex, which means that they have multiple 
parts standing in relations to each other, and externally 
complex, which means that they are embedded in larger 
complex wholes consisting inter alia of the representational 
qualities of other distinct mental processes. 
Consider the experience E of wondering whether you turned the 
stove off this morning. This experience is not simply about the 
stove and its being on or off. Rather, your concern is complex 
and includes representing (thinking about) the stove as your 
stove, as an appliance, as persisting across time, as occupying a 
certain physical location, as previously having been used by 
you, as a valued object, as capable of being on and off, as having 
a color, a size, a function, an associated fire risk, and so on. 
Some of these will be in the front your attention and concern 
(the on switch, the fire risk), others at the periphery (its cooking 
function). 
Such qualities and relations belonging to (or associated by you 
with) the stove are co-represented in the experience E, not just 
concurrently, but in such a way as to form a unified whole of 
which each co-representational quality is a part. Some of these 
aboutness relations are illustrated in Figure 3. Each small arrow 









Mental Process Objective Referent 
stove. Each is what we might call a ‘partial representation’ 
involved in the whole representational complex that is about 
whether the stove is on. The large arrow signifies the aboutness 
of the total representational structure of which the other 









Figure 3: Complex of Representational Qualities in 
Experience E 
The representational complex with which you wonder about 
your stove in E is not static and will vary across time. It is also 
not the case that every person that wonders about your stove 
represents it in the same way and with the same set of qualities. 
However, some parts of this representational complex are 
essential to any mental process of any person that would relate 
to that very stove. For instance, your stove (and any stove) is 
represented as a physical object; and were it not so represented, 
the stove would fail entirely to be related to your thinking. You 
would not in fact be thinking about the stove at all. A 
representational quality directed to the material nature of 
something like a stove is so fundamental to our thoughts about 
physical objects that it normally goes unnoticed. Other parts are 
accidental. For instance, if you sell your stove and no longer 
represent it as one of your possessions, your thought can 
nonetheless be related to, and be about, the same stove. 
Additionally, mental processes do not occur in isolation. Every 
representational complex arises in the context of other 
representational qualities about not only the immediate object 
of concern but of the representing subject and the environment 
of this subject. Thus, your initial wondering takes place in 
combination with processes of representing your current 
environment, your bodily position and location, the obligations 
and tasks you are currently fulfilling, the present passage of 
time, the occurrences you just witnessed and the anticipated 
occurrences just beginning, and much more.  
Horizon 
This last-mentioned example points to another structural feature 
of mental processes. The structure of every representational 
mental process involves what phenomenologists have called its 
‘horizon’, which extends outward both spatially and temporally 
from the object or process in the foreground of the experience 
(22). Our representational complexes are directed not only to 
their target and its various parts and features as described above, 
but also to the expected and anticipated parts, features, 
relations, and actions of the target beyond what is currently 
presented. There are many sorts of horizons corresponding to 
the different contexts within which our mental processes 
represent. 
For example, your stove, when you stand before it and perceive 
it, is represented also as having parts and features that are not 
wholly present to you (its inside, its backside, its weight, the 
cable connecting it to the power supply, its dispositions, for 
instance to cause a fire). They are co-represented as waiting, in 
the background so to speak, for you to perceive should you turn 
your attention to them. The directedness corresponding to the 
parts and properties of an object that are co-represented but not 
immediately present in the experience make up what can be 
called the object’s ‘internal horizon’. There is also an ‘external 
horizon’ of directedness towards the relations and anticipated 
actions of an object of concern. This anticipatory structure can 
be illustrated by our experience of processes unfolding in time. 
The experience of witnessing the beginning of an action you are 
familiar with, say the leap of a cat, co-represents the anticipated 
path of flight and landing. The expected unfolding of the cat’s 
action makes the experience to be about a leap from the very 
start. 
There are also elements of the horizon that pertain to the context 
of the occurrence of the mental process itself. Since mental 
processes occur in the context of other concurrent mental 
processes, what we might call a ‘subjective’ horizon extends 
out to the anticipated further experiences of the conscious 
subject herself. The horizon of a single representational mental 
process involves representational qualities directed to other 
potential experiences of other objective referents and other 
mental processes. In the above example, the perception of the 
leap of a cat includes the anticipation of its landing, but the 
perceptual process also represents something about itself and its 
own potential. It co-represents its own expected continuation, 
and specifically a continuation that leads to the presentation of 
the completion of the cat’s landing. The subjective horizon of a 
perceptual experience also relates to the potential for further 
perspectives. The directedness to the cat’s leap includes the co-
representation of your perspective and its potential to change 
with respect to that leap. For example, should the cat leap 
behind a tree and just out of view, co-represented is a horizon 
of potential adjustments to your perspective needed to get a 
better view of the landing. 
The horizon of mental process can also include representations 
of the mental processes of other persons (22). We see the world 
not merely as we see it but also, potentially, as Jim, over there 
on the other side of the room, would see it. Should we see Jim 
looking with interest around a corner that occludes our view, 
our perception has as a part of its horizonal content a 
representation of Jim’s perspective. His action is seen as 
including a perspective we ourselves could have should we go 
over next to him and look for ourselves. This is part of what we 
might call the ‘inter-subjective horizon’, consisting of those 
familiar and expected mental features, processes, and behaviors 
of other persons and other thinking organisms. For example, 
Jim’s action is, in the normal case, perceived as motivated and 
rational. His behavior of looking around a corner is an objective 
referent whose horizon points to a motive, purpose, and 
perspective that Jim bears, and that purpose, motive, and 






























A further central structural dimension of our experience is the 
dimension of fulfillment. When we witness the completion of 
the cat’s leap we experience a fulfillment of our initial 
expectation. What had initially been mere anticipations of leap 
and landing become filled by perceptual experiences of those 
very leap and landing processes themselves. 
Should you go home and check on the stove you were 
wondering about, the representational qualities of your 
consciousness mental processes will continue to change. Yet 
when you arrive home the stove will (in non-pathological cases) 
be represented as the same stove as you wondered about earlier 
in the day. Although new representations of the stove are 
produced, they are not only about the same objective referent as 
earlier wondered about, but they are specifically about the stove 
“as” earlier wondered about, your new mental processes being 
about your stove in its relation to your previous concern.  
Finding that the stove is switched off may offer a sense of relief 
– something it would not do if you had not been concerned to 
check on it in the first place.  For you to check on and verify 
that the stove is in fact off (in the canonical case) involves you 
yourself perceiving that the stove is off. This amounts to 
perceptually representing the stove and finding it to be as it was 
previously thought to be. In this process of verifying, 
representational qualities belonging to the process of wondering 
are brought into relation with the representational qualities and 
objective referent of a process of perception. This bringing into 
relation is a distinct higher-order process that is directed to both 
the stove as wondered about and to the stove as perceived, and 
through them represents a new situation: the stove’s being as it 
was thought to be. The fulfillment of the wondering about the 
stove by way of the perception of the stove is more than a 
sequence or even a co-representation, but a unity, what has been 
termed a ‘fusion’ of parts that represents a new object based on 
these parts (10). This sense might be expressed with the 
exclamation “Whew! The stove is off”. 
Through this new process the stove is represented not just as 
being off, but also as related to another higher-level distinct 
representation with its own distinct character; what might call 
the apprehension of truth. A representation of this sort is 
remarkable because it describes a case of knowledge 
acquisition and belief formation not just about the stove (the 
objective referent) but of a representational structure itself. The 
process of wondering whether the stove was on or off is 
represented as settled and the representational directedness 
towards the stove’s being off is represented as correct or true. 
This is something that neither mere wondering nor perception 
nor the sequence of the two could ever result in on their own. 
Simple perceptual validation and its twin, the process of 
perceptual frustration form the basis also of scientific 
observation and hence of all scientific evidence gathering (10).  
Consider another example. When a dermatologist examines a 
skin lesion for indications of a melanoma, she often intends to 
make a determination whether a biopsy is warranted. But, 
before this determination can be made an initial examination 
directed toward the question of whether the patient’s lesion 
bears the clinical phenotype of a melanoma will need to be 
established. Her examination will typically be directed to 
ascertaining the presence of those phenotypical features. 
The examination process is a perceptual process that represents 
the lesion along with a context of horizons. Her perceptual 
examination will include, among other things, representations 
making up 
 
a. the intersubjective horizon of the patient (what to ask 
them, how to communicate with them),  
 
b. the internal horizon of the lesion (coloration, structural 
features of the epidermis and dermoepidermal junction), 
 
c. the subjective horizon of her potential to get a better view 
(using a dermascope, moving a lighting source to fix color 
and shadowing effects), and  
 
d. the external horizon of relations (the age of the lesion, 
the behavior of the patient, family history). 
 
As the examination proceeds the perceptual processes involved 
will fulfill to various degrees these horizons, and while doing 
so will also directly represent various features relevant to the 
clinical phenotype of a melanoma. Should the features 
perceptually represented fulfill the doctor’s initial 
representation affirmatively, she will find the lesion to in fact 
bear that phenotype. The initial question will represented as 
settled and the representation questioned, that the lesion has the 
phenotype of a melanoma, will be represented to be true. 
The examination of these familiar cases of wondering and 
examining illustrate both the structure and complexity of the 
aboutness that is part of our everyday conscious experience. 
Such complexity points to the difficulty of describing mental 
processes. Whether for the sake of scientific research, therapy, 
diagnosis, or even personal communication about drinks at 
party next week, there is a potential for misidentification and 
misinterpretation. Despite these difficulties, it is worth pointing 
out that we know perfectly well what is intended when someone 
tells us that they are wondering whether or not they left the 
stove on. We know what they mean, and we know to some 
degree what they are thinking about and how they are thinking 
about it. We also know what sort of actions and experiences 
(and what further representations) would settle their concern. 
This is true in general. When we know what someone is 
thinking about and how they are thinking about it, we know also 
what portions of reality and what sorts of representations 
directed to them would fulfill their intentions, satisfy their 
desires, help to prove their statements true or false, motivate 
their actions, or explain the meaning of their words. All of this 
is due in large part to the sharing of a common real world to 
which our thoughts are directed and to the shareable repertoire 
of representational qualities that direct us to it. 
Representational qualities are tied to their respective objects 
in non-arbitrary ways 
Each mental process, in virtue of the representational qualities 
instantiated within it, represents its target in regular and 
distinctive ways according to its process type. Perceptual 
processes represent the thing perceived to be both sensorially 
present and to be causally responsible for the perceptual process 
itself. A judgment represents some state of affairs as obtaining 
or not obtaining (for example, that the stove is off, that the 
dinner was cold). An emotion represents a thing or an event as 
differentially valued, as dangerous (in fear) or sudden (in 
surprise). An expectation represents something as not occurring 
but as at the same time impending. These representational 
quality types cannot be arbitrarily exchanged as they are tied to 
the qualitative character that participates in each mental process 
according to its type. 
The Emotion Ontology (MFOEM) makes use of this 
relationship between the representational quality types and 
mental process types. Consider the MFOEM definition of the 
emotion process of fear. 
Fear =def. An activated, aversive emotion that motivates 
attempts to cope with events that provide threats to the 
survival or well-being of organisms. Characterized by 
feelings of threat and impending doom, and by an urge to 
get out of the situation. 
The representational qualities associated with specific types of 
emotion processes are captured in MFOEM under ‘appraisal’. 
The emotion process of fear has as a part the ‘appraisal of 
dangerousness’ defined as follows. 
Appraisal of Dangerousness =def. An appraisal that 
represents an evaluation that an object or situation is 
dangerous to the person (MFOEM).  
The emotion process of fearing thus essentially involves the 
quality of representing an object or situation as being dangerous 
to the fearing agent. If someone were to appraise an object or 
event to be safe and secure they could not be said to be afraid 
of it. Similar principles apply also to the behavioral and 
physiological dimensions of emotion. Thus, the 
representational qualities of fear go hand in hand, for example 
with an increase in heart and breathing rate, increased muscle 
tension, and piloerection (goose bumps), to name a few. 
In cases where the behavioral, affective, and other 
physiological experiences that are normal for the fearing 
experience are present without the representational qualities 
characteristic of fear, we would regard the person to be 
suffering a disorder. 
We can enhance the MFOEM definition of ‘fear’ by noting that 
there are representational qualities expressed in the definition 
but currently couched in terms of feelings. MFOEM adds to the 
definition of ‘fear’ the comment that it is “characterized by 
feelings of threat and impending doom …”. Here the term 
‘feelings’, is best understood to imply that the agent is 
representing something to be threatening, impending, and 
dooming. MFOEM does not have a term for ‘feeling of threat’ 
or ‘feeling of impending doom’ and ‘feeling’ itself is defined as 
follows: 
Feeling =def.  The subjective emotional feeling is that (fiat) 
part of the emotion process by which the organism 
experiences its own emotion. 
 
While the subjective emotional feelings involved in fear would 
conform to the above definition and would include at least the 
feeling of fear and quite possibly other related feelings of dread 
or terror, there are also associated representations of 
dangerousness that include as a part not the feelings but the 
representational directedness to threat and impending doom. 
  
The description of these representational qualities can be 
extended along the lines discussed above. We add to this 
description that fear, in the normal case, includes co-
representations of the presence of a potential and expected 
harm, such that there is an anticipation of the imminent 
realization of that harm, and also that the feared thing itself is 
represented as something that adversely affects conditions and 
possibilities that the organism deems valuable and important. 
Being struck with the fear that your laptop containing important 
work may be irrevocably broken has as a part the conscious 
representational directedness to the threatening condition of the 
damaged laptop as well as the impending doom that a 
permanent loss would entail. Of course, if nothing in the laptop 
is of sufficiently serious value, then these representations would 
normally not arise and neither would the emotion of fear. 
Objective Referent  
We have thus far addressed the role of the objective referent in 
this discussion, only briefly, with respect to its place in the 
representational relation and its role in the processes of 
fulfillment. Representational qualities, however, are themselves 
to a great deal dependent on and determined by the nature of the 
entities they are about. An aboutness directed to a color could 
not be directed to sound, and an aboutness directed to a person 
could not also be directed to the number five. Each entity type 
determines the ways its instances can be both represented and 
known (for example, sounds are heard, colors seen, equations 
calculated). Each entity type also limits the ways its instances 
can be represented and known. These are not accidental 
relationships and there is a remarkable isomorphism between 
what sorts of things exists and how those things are related to 
conscious mental processes. Were it not the case, then any sort 
of entity with any set of features, could be represented by any 
sort of mental process with any set of features. To the contrary, 
sounds cannot be premises in deductions, colors cannot be 
known through a process of counting, and equations cannot be 
found as spatially extended objects orbiting the earth. 
Towards a foundation for the Cognitive Process Ontology 
(CPO) 
With this account in hand, we now turn to the ontological 
representation of mental processes using Basic Formal 
Ontology (BFO) as our top-level ontology. 
We limit ourselves to representational mental processes of a 
sort that are experienced consciously and are basic to our shared 
mental lives and to our shared mental vocabulary. Trivially, 
mental processes are a type of BFO: process. Process in BFO is 
a very broad term, but comprehends inter alia the coming into 
being, sustaining, modifying, or passing away of a quality or 
qualities. 
A quality in BFO is a Specifically Dependent Continuant (SDC) 
that inheres in some independent continuant (IC). In the case of 
representational mental qualities, the relevant independent 
continuant is the cognitive system or relevant parts thereof of a 
conscious organism. When I am thinking about something, 
representational qualities inhere in the relevant parts of my 
cognitive system, and correspondingly, those parts of my 
cognitive system bear the representational qualities. In this way 
my thinking processes relate me, by way of my cognitive 
system, to the entities I think about. (See Figure 4.) 
Consequently, mental processes are changes in qualities borne 
by an organism’s cognitive system. Following (18) we define 
‘mental quality’ as follows: 
Mental Quality =def. Quality which specifically depends 
on an anatomical structure in the cognitive system of an 
organism. 
Throughout the occurrence of a mental process, the cognitive 
system of an organism participates in the process by bearing 
the mental qualities that come into being, endure, change, or 
pass away. The qualities themselves participate in the process 
as those entities that are formed, sustained, modified, or 
destroyed by the process. We term the whole qualitative 
structure of representational mental qualities a ‘mental 
representation’ and define ‘representation’ and ‘mental 
representation’, as follows: 
Representation =def. Quality which is about or is intended 
to be about a portion of reality. 
Mental Representation =def. Representation which is a 
mental quality. 
We can now clarify talk of mental processes and their 
aboutness. Mental processes have aboutness only derivatively; 
their aboutness is due to the representational qualities that are 
involved as participants in those processes. Aboutness does not 
inhere in a process but in the thinker as she is related to the 
target (some entity or portion of reality) that is being thought 
about. The conscious processes of a cognitive system, as we 
experience and communicate about them, are changes in the 
vast qualitative structures of aboutness we consciously live 
through. Following our definitions, representational mental 
processes thus consist in the coming into being, sustaining, 
modifying, or passing away of mental representations of 
various complexity and duration. 
Representational Mental Process =def. process that is the 
bringing into being, sustaining, modifying, or terminating 
a mental representation. (5) 
The basic structural components of a mental representation are 
its representational character and representational directedness 
defined as follows:  
Representational Character =def. a quality that is part of a 
mental representation and determines the way in which that 
representation is about its objective referent.  
Representational Directedness =def. a quality that is part of 
a mental representation and determines the way its 















Figure 4. Representational Mental Process  
Discussion 
Consider now the difference between the characters of 
processes of fearing, questioning, imagining, and regretting. An 
adult under suitable conditions is able to distinguish between 
these on the basis of the representational relation each has to its 
object. A question process represents its object as yet to be 
determined, an imaginative process as unreal, a regret as past. 
An ordinary adult, similarly, cannot fear what she represents as 
past or regret what she represents as unreal. These examples are 
not intended to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for 
each process type but rather to point to the sorts of ties that hold 
between character, representational content, and objective 
referent. As a matter of principle descriptions of such ties, when 
made explicit, often appear as more than obvious to anyone that 
has feared, questioned, imagined, or regretted.  
When mental process data are collected whether for cognitive 
research experiments, cognitive and behavioral therapies, 
psychiatric evaluation, correlations in neuro imaging studies, or 
for review and evaluation of diagnostic and other analytical 
practices, then, one important organizational dimension of these 
data relates to the coming into being, changing, and passing 
away of complexes of mental representations. 
Potential difficulties and further research. 
Although cognitive processes have been discussed in the above 
as if they were discrete events, our conscious lived experience 
is much more like a continuous flow. Divisions into wondering, 
doubting, perceiving, and so forth, although not arbitrary, 
delineate events that of their own character do not exist in 
isolation but are rather fused together in much larger complexes 
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however, remove the significance of the distinctions we have 
drawn, but it makes isolating and studying individual processes 
all the more challenging. Nevertheless, the types instantiated by 
such processes are important for at least three reasons: 1. They 
are real. Neither the dependence nor the continuous nature of 
an entity makes the entity any less real (compare colors, sounds, 
lexical typography, state borders). 2. Essential distinguishing 
characteristics and law-like axioms pertain to these entities, as 
the many examples introduced above demonstrate. 3. We speak 
easily and naturally of hoping, desiring, reasoning, evaluating, 
knowing, and these terms are essential ingredients in any 
ontology or cognitive science that hopes to communicate about 
the portions of reality that form its own subject matter.  
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